University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Management Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

2008

The Boundaries of the Thinkable
Philip E. Tetlock
University of Pennsylvania

Michael Oppenheimer

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons

Recommended Citation
Tetlock, P. E., & Oppenheimer, M. (2008). The Boundaries of the Thinkable. Dædalus, 137 (2), 59-70.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/daed.2008.137.2.59

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/107
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

The Boundaries of the Thinkable
Disciplines
Business | Business Administration, Management, and Operations

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/107

Philip E. Tetlock & Michael Oppenheimer
The boundaries of the thinkable

B

e it conservatism or liberalism,
Marxism or libertarianism, or our topic
at hand–environmentalism–all ‘isms’
come with conceptual boundaries–and
litmus tests for which opinions fall inside or outside the bounds of reasonableness for that ‘ismatic’ worldview.
Can a good conservative back abortion
rights or higher marginal tax rates? Or
a good liberal condone racial pro½ling?
Or a good communist support China’s
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transformation into a capitalist state?
Or a good paci½st endorse military intervention in Darfur? Or a good environmentalist support pollution trading permits, French-style nuclear-energy programs, or the Copenhagen Consensus’s
low-priority ranking of the threat posed
by global warming?
These questions resist precise answers
because ‘isms’ don’t obey the norms of
classical logic (notwithstanding the occasional efforts of thought police to lay
out well-de½ned necessary and suf½cient
conditions for category inclusion and
exclusion). ‘Isms’ are best viewed as fuzzy sets with porous, shifting boundaries
–and as organized around prototypes.
This means that although it is easy at
any given juncture in history to design
a prototypic ‘ismatic’ belief system (informed observers can rattle off with
high interjudge agreement the positions,
pro and con, that the prototypical ‘true
believer’ should take), it is hard to say at
what point one has added or subtracted
enough features to or from the prototype
that it no longer falls in its original category–and the liberal has become a conservative or vice versa (hence the frequent need for transition categories like
‘neoconservatives’ and ‘neoliberals’).
Political psychologists have a longstanding interest in how communities
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of cobelievers de½ne the boundaries of
the thinkable and where they set their
thresholds for issuing fatwas, excommunicating deviants, excluding former participants from coalitions, or just shunning someone at a cocktail party. Our
starting point is Tetlock’s sacred value
protection model (svpm),1 which takes
as its starting point an undeniable fact
of political life: the tendency of likeminded souls to coalesce into communities of cobelievers dedicated to defending and advancing shared values. The
svpm posits that cobelievers seek reassurance from each other that their beliefs are not mere social conventions
but rather are anchored in backstop or
sacred values beyond challenge. These
values can be as diverse as the causes
around which human beings cluster:
in pro-life communities, it would be bizarre to challenge the sacred mission
of saving the unborn; in libertarian
communities, it would be bizarre to
challenge the sacred status of property
rights; and in scienti½c communities or
groups relying on scienti½c expertise, it
would be bizarre to challenge the notion
that assertions about nature can be tested objectively (within a range of uncertainty) and deep truths revealed. Those
foolish enough to ask why sacred values
are so special–what is wrong with stem
cell research or faking data or redistributive taxation?–reveal themselves to be
dim-witted or ill-intentioned outsiders
who just don’t get it.
Here it is worth pausing to note that
our topic at hand–elite environmentalist organizations–already poses a special challenge to our analytic framework.
Insofar as these organizations attach a
1 P. E. Tetlock, “Social-Functionalist Frameworks for Judgment and Choice: The Intuitive
Politician, Theologian, and Prosecutor,” Psychological Review 109 (2002): 451–472.
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sacred status to both moral values, such
as a commitment to be good custodians
of the planet for the sake of future generations, and scienti½c values, such as a
commitment to abandoning preconceptions about what constitutes good custodianship in response to dissonant evidence, these organizations inevitably
straddle the boundaries of politics, science, and increasingly religion. Straddlers, so de½ned, are especially vulnerable to the most psychologically painful
type of value conflict–that between
competing sacred values. The canonical
dilemmas are those in which either ½delity to scienti½c norms requires acknowledging evidence that undercuts
a policy stance one prefers on moral
grounds, or ½delity to moral-political
objectives requires ignoring or discounting evidence that one knows has probative scienti½c value. Hypothetical examples of the former dilemma might be:
‘I detest the nuclear power industry but
increasingly see it as a key part of the
solution to global warming,’ or ‘I ½nd
emissions trading ethically distasteful
but must admit that it seems to work
quite well.’ Examples of the latter might
be: ‘If I acknowledge this flaw in these
computer models of global climate, critics will seize on it to stall even more,’ or
‘If I concede that this geoengineering
proposal has merit, it opens the door to
a wave of far more dangerous schemes.’
These sources of ambivalence complicate applying the svpm, for it is much
easier to predict the behavior of individuals and organizations not torn by clashing sacred values–those with no compunctions about suppressing inconvenient facts or about inventing convenient
ones.
With these caveats, we push forward.
Drawing on a long list of social scientists
over the past century, especially Emile
Durkheim, the svpm identi½es two typ-

ical methods that moral communities
use to defend sacred values: moral outrage and moral cleansing. The model
also identi½es a powerful class of variables capable of modulating moralistic
responses: real-world constraints.
The model de½nes moral outrage as
an aversive arousal state, with cognitive,
affective, and behavioral components:
harsh trait attributions to norm violators, anger and contempt aimed at them,
and enthusiastic support for thought police charged with enforcing both norms
and the meta-norm of punishing those
who fail to punish norm violators. It is
worth stressing that the model predicts
sharp reactions against even those
caught contemplating taboo trade-offs
or contaminated compromises. The psycho-logic here is that of ‘constitutive
incommensurability’: our commitments
to other people require us to deny that
certain things are comparable (e.g., valuing lives in dollars). Constitutive incommensurability arises whenever treating
a value as commensurable subverts one
of the values in the trade-off calculus. In
this sense, taboo trade-offs are morally
corrosive. The longer observers believe
that a decision maker has contemplated
an indecent proposal, the harsher their
assessments of that person’s character,
even if that person ultimately comes
around and makes the right choice and
af½rms the sacred value.
Moral cleansing is identity repair, efforts by those who feel contaminated by
psychological proximity to norm violations to persuade in-group members
not to direct moral outrage at them.
For instance, the closer one’s working
relationship with a norm violator, the
greater one’s need will be to engage in
symbolic acts of moral cleansing that
reaf½rm one’s solidarity with the moral
community. In the antique language of
psychoanalysis, one overcompensates

The boundby becoming a superpatriot or a superaries of the
environmentalist. As with moral outthinkable
rage, moral cleansing can be triggered
by merely seriously entertaining taboo
trade-offs, even if one ultimately returns
to the ideological fold and ‘does the right
thing.’
The svpm accepts that people are often sincere when they express moral outrage and engage in moral cleansing. But
the model also portrays a delicate mental
balancing act. People regularly run into
decision problems in which the costs of
upholding sacred values become very
steep–arguably prohibitive. If parents
dedicated their net worth to reducing
to a probability of zero all threats to
their children’s safety, for example, they
would rapidly impoverish themselves.
Likewise, a society committed to guaranteeing state-of-the-art health care for
all citizens would soon devote an unacceptable proportion of its gdp to the
project. The model predicts that when
there is no pressure to confront secularsacred trade-offs, people and political
movements will adopt the low-mentaleffort solution of accepting their own
side’s no-trade-off rhetoric at face value.
Such low-effort options are easiest to
deploy in the political sphere when one’s
movement is in an oppositional role (as
environmentalists mostly feel they have
been during the Bush administration)
and has no responsibility for making
policy.2 However, trade-off denial is not
an option when one is compelled to develop and advance politically viable solutions, not just denounce the solutions
proposed by others.

2 P. E. Tetlock, K. Hannum, and P. Micheletti,
“Stability and Change in Senatorial Debate:
Testing the Cognitive Versus Rhetorical Style
Hypotheses,” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition 46
(1984): 979–990.
Dædalus Spring 2008
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Having laid our framework, we now
explore the potential utility and limitations of this model for understanding
the evolution of policy stands of environmentalist organizations in the United States over the last twenty-½ve years.
Our approach is of necessity largely anecdotal, and based mostly on the experiences of one of us (Oppenheimer) as a
professional environmentalist between
1981 and 2001–as well as an observer
of environmental policy and occasional
advocate up to the present. The subjective and impressionistic nature of our
approach underscores the relative scarcity of academic literature analyzing the
structure, modus operandi, funding,
and motivations of U.S. environmental
organizations and individual environmental activists, a shortcoming that
cries out to be recti½ed, given the current centrality of ‘green’ politics. We
hope this essay will encourage others to
dig into the extensive archival material
available and to interview key participants in the debates.
Our overview of how several controversies have played out in the environmental community and larger political
arena underscores how hard it is to ½t
any one-size-½ts-all theoretical model.
Terms that theorists casually bandy
about have sharply contested meanings
in the real world. For instance, ‘taboo’
proves to be a Rashomon concept, connoting principle and resolve to those
determined to defend the boundaries of
the thinkable, and rigidity and dogmatism to those determined to cross the
boundary. Whose de½nition prevails in
the battle for public opinion and political-regulatory favor determines whose
policy agenda prevails.
Here we consider four examples of
how this political-psychological tug-ofwar has unfolded in environmental policy debates: the disposition of the ArcDædalus Spring 2008

tic National Wildlife Refuge (anwr),
nuclear power, emissions trading, and
geoengineering of the climate. In each
case, we identify how the most ardent
environmental organizations have de½ned the issue as a matter of principle
(What are the sacred values at stake?
What options should be considered
taboo?) and examine how successful
these organizations have been in mobilizing uniformly solid opposition to policy options that threaten to breach the
principle/taboo boundary: Were there
ever–or are there now–signi½cant dissenters within the environmentalist
community? Were these dissenters the
targets of moral outrage? Did those
linked to the dissenters feel the need to
engage in moral cleansing? In each case,
we also pose questions viewed as taboo
by morally resolute boundary defenders
but as mandatory by those who see environmentalism as the application of the
analytical tools of science to public policy. The recurring identity-de½ning questions will be: What would change your
mind? How far would the generalized
cost-bene½t calculus need to tip for you
to modify or even abandon your policy
positions?

L

egally protected since 1960, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (anwr)
occupies the far northeast corner of
Alaska, running from the Arctic Ocean
south across the Brooks Range into the
Yukon Valley. It has been referred to
(not uniquely) as America’s Serengeti
because of the annual caribou migration
that passes through, in addition to the
grizzly bears, wolves, and other resident
fauna, an appellation that neatly sums
up its iconic status.
With the convergence of two oil supply crises in the 1970s and the consideration of the Alaska Lands Act to determine disposition of hundreds of millions

of acres of land among federal, state, and
Native American governance as a delayed consequence of Alaska statehood,
the issue of whether to allow drilling for
oil in the area became pointed. Distrust
of the environmental reliability and ½scal probity of oil companies, who were
already developing a pipeline and drilling complex to the west at Prudhoe Bay,
ran high. Views on native rights sometimes conflicted, with some based on
sacred views of the land and others on
½nancial interest in drilling. The U.S.
environmental movement became committed to opposing drilling entirely (Oppenheimer visited the area in 1975 and
testi½ed in Congress in favor of leaving it
pristine, a position he maintains today),
and the ½nal legislation forbade drilling
without further permission from Congress. Such permission, fought over sporadically for thirty years, has never been
granted, as environmental opposition
has remained steadfast.
Among the cases we examine, anwr
is the only one in which a taboo seems
to have functioned as a nearly absolute
bar to repositioning. How have environmentalists managed to be so successful
in holding the taboo line on anwr?
We see a number of possibilities. First,
the attack has not been nearly as ferocious as it could have been if the oil industry itself had been more committed
to prevailing. The industry is worried
about drilling costs, and the bad publicity and legal liabilities that would attach to accidents–and may well perceive other drilling opportunities as
more pro½table investments. To some
degree, the political ½ght over anwr
may be a diversionary maneuver while
these ½rms attempt to gain access to
other, less noticed reserves. Second, the
remoteness of anwr may paradoxically add to anwr’s allure and iconic status as untouched natural land. From

one point of view, its remoteness means The boundthat the vast majority of Americans will aries of the
thinkable
never visit it, and many may never have
heard of it. But the success in protecting the anwr region over thirty years
has reinforced its uniqueness, made it
more renowned as a special place, and
strengthened the utility of taboo as a
political gambit.
Although trade-offs have been discussed, such as bartering permission to
drill in anwr for agreement to increase
the stringency of Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for motor vehicles, it is unclear whether these discussions ever came close to being a serious
‘deal.’ For one thing, the deal would not
have been a simple trade-off: those who
might bene½t directly from drilling (oil
companies) are not the same group as
those who might suffer from an increase
in fuel-economy stringency (auto companies and their workers). Yet a third
group, environmentalists and those they
represent, would lose from drilling but
gain from increased stringency on fuel
economy, but different constituencies
within the movement might see the
gains and losses differently. Such compromises are not easily arranged. Furthermore, the total reserves in the Refuge correspond to only about six months
of U.S. consumption, which, even if economically recoverable, is equivalent to
an amount of consumption that could
be avoided by a small increment in vehicle fuel economy without any tradeoff (making the trade-off look super½cial).
To gauge how robust this–or any
other taboo–has become, one needs
to subject it to counterfactual stress
testing and explore the willingness of
respondents to change their minds in
response to increasingly tough hypothetical arguments: for example, if oil
companies could reduce the likelihood
Dædalus Spring 2008
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of signi½cant spills to zero; if the value
of reserves exceeded ½ve or more years’
worth of consumption; or if excess
pro½ts could be used in part to compensate local communities or to protect endangered species elsewhere.
A more directly relevant hypothetical
would be trading complete protection
of a large, imminently threatened area
of Arctic wilderness (the Kamchatka
Peninsula, for example) for permission
to drill in anwr. It is unclear what
transnational entity would have such
power, but assuming it existed, the willingness of the environmental community to entertain such a trade would still
be highly doubtful.
The most resolute antiutilitarian defender of the taboo would be a respondent who refuses to participate on the
ground that the questioning process is
morally corrosive (to compare is to destroy): a process akin to asking how
much money it would take to sell your
children to slave traders. The next level
down would be those who insist that
there is no remotely plausible cost-bene½t calculus that would change their
minds. The next levels down now put
us on a potentially slippery-slope continuum of af½xing increasingly plausible numerical values to questions that
open the door–to varying degrees under varying contingencies–to compromise. These latter respondents may
pride themselves for their pragmatism
but risk the moral wrath of the taboo defenders should the bar on anwr development ever come under serious political threat.

The pros and cons of nuclear power

have been discussed at great length elsewhere, and we shall not repeat them in
detail. On the ‘pro’ side are electricity
production free of direct emission of air
pollution and greenhouse gases, and rel64
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atively low operating costs. On the ‘con’
side are the threat of radiation releases
(and resulting cancer incidence) during
mining and transport of fuel and plant
operation (including core meltdown);
no implemented plan for long-term
waste disposal; possible diversion of
wastes for weapons production; targeting of plants by terrorists; and in the
United States, high cost of construction
despite various subsidies. Accidents at
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl–and
since then, the continual stories of leaks
at aging plants–have kept public concern at the level where a majority in the
United States do not want one built in
their neighborhood. Yet nuclear power
delivers 20 percent of U.S. electricity, recently renovated plants have been operating smoothly and ef½ciently, and some
countries have had a fairly good record
of safety and ef½ciency, if not a solution
to the waste-storage issue.
Perhaps more than any other example,
nuclear power is an issue that carries
iconic status on both sides. In contrast
to the skepticism expressed by many environmentalists, the ‘other side’ poses
support for nuclear power as a litmus
test of environmentalists’ seriousness
about clean energy, and attempts to position opponents as Luddites: ‘You want
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions? If
you are serious, rather than just an enemy of electric power companies, economic growth, and progress for humanity, surely you must support nuclear power, or at least be willing to contemplate it
as a serious part of solving the problem.’
Substitute acid rain or air pollution for
carbon dioxide (or the desire to avoid
building hydropower dams on iconic
rivers like the Colorado), and you have
the raw outlines of a conversation going back many decades. In fact, many of
these conversations seem to have less to
do with speci½c electric-power options

as they do with symbolism, as in: ‘Are
you man enough to accept nuclear power?’ Such rhetorical gambits have probably only intensi½ed the polarization.
Meanwhile, many environmentalists
see nuclear power as a symptom of
mega-project-itis: a bloated, highly subsidized (through public-research funding and limits on liability for accidents),
unnecessarily centralized way to generate power, attention to which deflects
political and ½nancial resources from
lower-impact, distributed technologies
that increase ef½ciency and employ renewable options, like solar power.
Are environmentalists in fact willing
to countenance relaxation of the apparent taboo without exiling those guilty of
doing so? Here the record is less clear.
Recently, some environmental leaders
have indicated a willingness to reconsider the movement’s near-total aversion to
nuclear power;3 and while this arguably
new stance has elicited criticism for ‘going soft,’ in fact the same groups still
work together at about the same level of
cooperation (and sometimes lack thereof ) on the same issues as they did previously. Although there have been skepticism and annoyance over the perceived
taboo violations, there is little evidence
of either ostracism or a perceived need
for moral cleansing. Of course, the ‘reconsideration’ may be little more than a
repositioning to divert, deflect, or transcend the ‘manliness’ argument, and opponents of altering the view may read it
as such, reducing their need to ostracize.
In any event, the repositioning was
part of the ½rst steps in wheeling-anddealing over climate-change legislation,
providing a real-life test of just how taboo nuclear power is: despite the apparent shift in attitude on the part of some
3 See “Old Foes Soften to New Reactors,” The
New York Times, May 15, 2005.

The boundenvironmentalists, several senators reversed their support for global-warming aries of the
thinkable
legislation proposed by Senators McCain and Lieberman and voted against
it due to the insertion of a provision encouraging nuclear power. But since the
legislation had no chance of passage
anyway, this outcome was more a visible
way to take a shot across the bow, rather
than a ½rm, ½nal position. However, it
is expected that the issue will be revived
again over the next two years because
the chances of successful federal legislation have increased. Then the trade-offs
involved in supporting the building of
new nuclear plants (using existing technology) to reduce carbon-dioxide emissions may become quite pointed because
the problems with nuclear power that
provide the rational basis for taboo remain.
Theoretical solutions to all the technical problems of nuclear power abound;
whether they can be implemented at a
cost competitive with other carbon-free
options is an unanswered question. Until it is answered, the question of whether the taboo is absolutely applicable to
all nuclear technology, or just the current versions, will remain hypothetical.
Rather, the skirmish in the political arena may be over whether an arguably
faulty and expensive technology with little immediate prospect for expansion is
worth further subsidy and other inducements to get controls on greenhouse-gas
emissions.
The question of whether an ‘irrational’ taboo is at work may be buried under layers of plausible argument and
counterargument. The only way we
know to answer the question is via systematic counterfactual stress testing.
The nuclear industry argues that it can
build reactors that produce very low levels of waste that can be safely disposed
of, and that entail no signi½cant potenDædalus Spring 2008
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tial for attack or diversion for production of weapons. If all this could be accomplished at a cost competitive with
other sources, would–and should–a
majority of opponents relent? The sign
of a taboo–in something resembling
the original anthropological sense of the
term (unconditional disgust unmediated
by reason)–is a categorical ‘no,’ coupled
with deep annoyance that you would
even ask the question.

After remaining buried in the econom-

ic literature for decades with scant attention paid to it in the policy arena, the
idea of controlling pollution by distributing free or through auction a limited
number of rights-to-pollute (called
emissions allowances), which could be
traded as commodities, was implemented on a large scale in the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments. The triggering event
was the emergence of bipartisan consensus on the need to reduce acid rain. And
the outstanding success of the program
in reducing pollution at much lower cost
than command-and-control approaches
that mandate particular technologies
has led to its being labeled the favored
means to limit emissions of the greenhouse gases, both in the United States
(assuming such a program will be implemented at the federal level) and in Europe (where it is currently in use to implement the Kyoto Protocol).
But the early history of emissions
trading was marked by controversy, and
many critics remain. Its initial rejection
in some quarters as a proposed solution
to the acid-rain problem reflected numerous concerns, including: that the
creation of a property right and a market in pollution amounted to letting polluters buy their way out of an obligation,
posing an ethical issue involving potential inequities; that trading would result
in a geographic distribution of pollution
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reductions dependent on an economic
calculus rather than environmental targets; that the ability of electric utilities
to switch to low-sulfur-content coal under a trading system would shift the distribution of employment in the coalmining industry; and that the entire system of accounting for emissions reductions and trading was too complex and
would allow gaming, lessening the actual
emissions reduction obtained.
One environmental group, the Environmental Defense Fund (now named
Environmental Defense), took an aggressive pro-trading stance, to the displeasure of most of its colleagues in the
movement. Many of the latter never
fully embraced the system and stood
aside from taking a position on the draft
legislation, of which they otherwise approved, because of the presence of this
feature (and its potential side effects,
noted above). Years later, when the effectiveness of the trading system was
beyond dispute, some environmentalists
made a point of emphasizing (correctly)
that the concomitant costs savings were
partly attributable to reductions in rail
rates for shipping coal, not the inherent
ef½ciency of trading.
But despite considerable opprobrium
(low to moderate moral outrage), it
would go too far to assert that Environmental Defense was ostracized. Support
for trading began a long series of disputes between those in the advocacy
community that supported flexible, incentive-based approaches to regulation
and those who preferred command-andcontrol regulation. These disputes are
still evolving, and today center on the
global-warming problem. Some individuals and organizations attacked protrading groups directly, while others
wriggled uncomfortably on the sidelines, occasionally indulging in acts that
may ½t the description of moral cleans-

ing. The attacks were often not for supporting trading per se but for other perceived wrongdoing involving issues of
procedure within the environmental
coalition. But the substantive differences
over trading aggravated these controversies. Despite such stresses and strains,
cooperation in the community has remained the dominant mode and no
group has been banished for support of
emissions trading.
On the other hand, many of those
opposed to trading have softened their
positions in response to, ½rst, the reality
of the effectiveness of the acid-rain program as a regulatory scheme and, second, the political and economic reality
of the ef½cacy of trading. In the ½rst category fall certain environmental organizations that either opposed or remained
neutral with respect to the trading elements of Title iv of the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments. Some of these soon
gave the highest compliment to the originators of Title iv, including Environmental Defense, by claiming partial
credit for its design once its success was
clear. An example of the second case is
the European Union (and some environmentalists therein), which originally
opposed designing implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol around an emissionstrading system. Nevertheless, the agreement reached in 1997 embodied the trading framework with a structure generally
following the lines of the U.S. proposal.
The eu, having grudgingly ceded to the
United States on this point, and then,
along with other Kyoto parties, suffered
the rebuff of U.S. withdrawal from the
Kyoto process in 2001, nonetheless
maintained emissions trading as a key
means for implementing the Protocol.
The intervening four years had seen too
much negotiation on the details of the
system to countenance ripping it up and
starting over, and some non-eu parties

were already positively disposed toward The boundaries of the
trading. The period also provided govthinkable
ernments with the opportunity to learn
more about the ef½cacy of trading. Furthermore, many in the eu retained a
belief in the possibility of reengaging the
United States even before the end of the
Bush administration. Consequently, the
eu proceeded to become the world’s
leading experimenter in trading greenhouse-gas allowances and, ironically, is
now a strong proponent of this approach
while the United States stands aside (for
the moment). Thus, the taboo has become the accepted practice.
Emissions trading still engenders argument but less over its ethical basis and
more over its consequences in speci½c
applications. Mercury emissions from
coal-burning electric power plants provide a case in point. Mercury is a neurotoxin with no known dose threshold for
causing damage, particularly in fetuses.
The Bush administration proposed to
control mercury emissions with a trading system that would inevitably create
disparities in emissions reduced at one
location versus another, and therefore
in human exposure (in contrast to carbon dioxide, which becomes globally
uniform after emission, or to acid-causing emissions, for which a separate set
of regulations limits local exposure and
from which no signi½cant geographic
‘hot spots’ of acid rain have been produced by the trading program). The reaction was immediate and uniformly
negative in the environmental community. If there were supporters of this
approach among trading proponents,
they kept their counsel.
This episode underscores at least one
strong, and arguably rational, basis for
the taboo in speci½c instances: trading
can result in dramatic inequities in local
impacts. So the idea of trading aggravated a long-standing dispute between loDædalus Spring 2008
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cal environmental groups (sometimes
unfairly and derisively called ‘nimby’
groups, i.e., Not in My Back Yard), who
focus on local pollution, and the national, professionalized groups, who often
see issues through the prism of national
or global environmental consequences.
For the latter groups, obtaining larger
overall cuts in pollution appeared at
times to take precedence over these local concerns. It is fair to say that the
sensitivity of the national groups has
substantially increased after a considerable drubbing by the locals, who
brought pressure to bear on the nationals through the media and also via funders such as foundations. Risking the
death of a small number of identi½able
people, usually poor, for the greater statistical good was just not a viable position for a movement that draws a substantial part of its membership and support from egalitarian progressives–and
is often accused of reflecting the tastes
and preferences of affluent professionals. In effect, ignoring equity concerns
became a new and effectively enforced
taboo–as we can now see by the uniform response in the case of mercury.
It is worth reconnoitering the evershifting boundaries of the thinkable.
Assuming no local inequities, would
opponents of trading accept it if all permits were auctioned, eliminating the
onus created by a seemingly free ‘right
to pollute’ that is established when they
are distributed to polluters (e.g., power
companies), as they largely were under
the acid-rain program? And, assuming
local inequities cannot be brought down
to zero, would suf½cient compensation
to local communities alleviate the disparate impacts that would occur in the
case of a pollutant, like mercury, with
local impacts? Although it seems plausible that the former proposal would gain
some adherents (especially considering
Dædalus Spring 2008

the expected returns to the government
from the auctions), the latter proposal
raises issues related to monetizing life–
one of the most taboo subjects of all.

A very current example is provided by

proposals to geoengineer the climate in
response to the threat of global warming. The idea here is to take action to oppose the effect of the buildup of greenhouse gases by implementing measures
that would either remove the warming
gases, e.g., carbon dioxide, from the atmosphere after emission, or alter the
Earth system so as to reduce sunlight
suf½ciently to negate the warming. An
example is a proposal to loft particles
that reflect sunlight high in the atmosphere in suf½cient quantity to cancel the
increasing greenhouse effect.
There are many good reasons to oppose such approaches without resort to
stigmatizing them altogether as taboo.
Many are arguably more costly than
measures to reduce emissions and avoid
much of the warming in the ½rst place.
They raise complex political issues because any country could effectively decide to geoengineer everyone’s climate
unilaterally. Finally, and most salient,
many or all such proposals entail potential side effects that could in the end rival the consequences of warming. For
example, reflecting particles could add
to the damage of the ozone layer, and
would do nothing to reverse acidi½cation of the oceans by dissolved carbon
dioxide. Furthermore, such geoengineering only masks warming, and should the
approach become unsustainable, a large
greenhouse-gas buildup, and accompanying warming, would be revealed.
It is not just the ability to cite such
consequences but the expectation of
unintended consequences that troubles
opponents. After all, such proposals are
effectively experiments on the whole

Earth system, and uncertainties in predicting how the system would respond
are vast.
But beyond this point, and drawing
strength from it, lies a principle that
many environmentalists and scientists
adhere to: it is simply wrong to ½x one
environmental problem by increasing
the risk of another. It is better to relieve
the prime causes (e.g., fossil-fuel combustion and deforestation) than to apply massive engineering techniques
with uncertain outcomes. Some also fear
that the very existence of a last-resort
option would reduce pressure to remediate emissions. It is this principle that has
placed geoengineering into the nearly
taboo category, relegated to slender consideration over at least twenty-½ve years
in voluminous analyses of how to solve
the climate problem. The recent publication of a special issue of the journal
Climatic Change dedicated to papers on
geoengineering was accompanied by an
unusual advance campaign to deflect the
inevitable criticism and shield the scientists publishing the papers from collegial
abuse.
Yet the uneasy feeling that countries
could postpone action on greenhouse
gases long enough to make emergency
engineering measures necessary to avoid
draconian consequences (like complete
meltdown of the Greenland ice sheet)
provides a strong rationale for at least
allowing theoretical research to proceed.
The issue of whether to allow or encourage small-scale demonstration experiments is much more controversial.
One could argue that the perception
of a rapidly changing climate has already
allowed reality to lessen the taboo. Nevertheless, geoengineering is likely to
remain a more or less taboo subject, at
least in the sense of marginalization
compared to other remedies, unless a
consequence-free approach is compel-

lingly presented or the climate does indeed get out of control.
To tease apart the relative importance
of the various reasons for opposing geoengineering, consider two tests of the
limits of this taboo: First, if our knowledge changed suddenly and it became
apparent that Earth were headed into an
ice age, would we entertain ways, such
as speeding up greenhouse-gas emissions, to maintain the stable global climate of the last several millennia? Second, would geoengineering be an appropriate response to natural warming,
were the latter shown to be large, lifethreatening, and imminent?

The boundaries of the
thinkable

T

he environmental movement represents a complex amalgam of ideas, interests, and styles of thinking. Some environmentalists (and environmental organizations) have a clear commitment
to the scienti½c method–and they feel
that the scienti½c norm of falsi½cation
requires them to view a broad range of
their beliefs as testable hypotheses. The
inability to answer the question, ‘What
would it take to convince you that you
are mistaken?’ would be a source of professional discomfort. The thought experiments with which we end each section
are the types of questions that such advocates would likely be willing to entertain. At the other end of the epistemic
continuum, some organizations may be
caricatured as displaying a quasi-religious devotion to protecting natural systems. Some of the thought experiments
with which we close each section are,
quite literally, unthinkable–and those
who ‘play the game’ do not understand
the moral stakes. Yet within such organizations are cleavages on how to approach particular issues. Many ‘expert’
groups have several dyed-in-the-wool
values-based staff members, and some
staffers at values-driven organizations
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are devoted to a science-based approach.
Even the views and approaches of individual environmentalists shift from issue to issue, with greater or less focus on
science versus other values.
From a scienti½c point of view, the
rigorous articulation of a belief system–
with airtight partitioning of facts and
values, crystal-clear speci½cation of
trade-off functions, and candid acknowledgement of what would count as
falsifying evidence–is an unalloyed (if
often unattainable) good. But it would
unfairly handicap environmentalists to
hold them to burdensome standards of
introspective rigor that no other political
movement accepts. What are the limits
that attach to willingness to acknowledge trade-offs between one’s epistemic
commitments to objectivity and one’s
moral-political commitments to likeminded souls struggling for causes one
deems just? We suspect that the shortterm challenges of policy campaigning
require sweeping such nettlesome tradeoffs under the rhetorical rug, but the
long-term challenges of governance ultimately require thinking more deeply
about how we think.
We again stress the exploratory nature
of our survey of the boundaries separating the ‘thinkable’ from the ‘unthinkable.’ But our modest effort has brought
to light serious complications that we
hope future, more systematic efforts will
address. On one hand, we discover what
seem to be strong pockets of taboo cognition–policy domains in which even
speculative forms of cost-bene½t analysis (would you change your mind if . . . ?)
are likely to provoke sharp resistance.
On the other, we discover numerous exceptions and quali½cations. It requires
more presumptuousness than we can
muster to label strong policy positions as
examples of taboo cognition when the
defenders of these positions can generDædalus Spring 2008

ate reasonable scienti½c and economic
objections that cannot be reduced to an
emotive ‘ugh’ reaction. (Distinguishing
reasons from rationalizations is a deep
problem with which social psychologists
have wrestled for many decades.) And,
even if we had a sure½re method of identifying true cases of taboo cognition, it
strikes us as unfair to characterize an
entire school of thought as upholding a
taboo when there is as much diversity
within and between organizations and
individuals as we ½nd among environmental organizations.
The core complication may well be
that taboos are hard to maintain in any
community of cobelievers in which the
funding sources are as diverse as those
for environmental organizations. Each
has its own culture, preferred issues, and
specialized approaches to solving them.
Donors, be they foundations or individuals, can shift support from one to another, making enforcement of a monolithic party line dif½cult, if not impossible. Such diversity can be viewed as
both political weakness and strength.
It is a weakness inasmuch as concerted
cooperation is necessary to pull together minimum winning coalitions in competitions for power in democratic politics. And it is a strength inasmuch as diversity signals a degree of openness to
debate and compromise within at least
portions of the environmental community. This very American combination
of characteristics leads us to suspect that
the ‘boundaries of the thinkable’ among
environmentalists will be subject to frequent challenges in the twenty-½rst century–challenges driven by technological
innovations, economic pressures, shifting political alignments, and new data
on the fragility or robustness of the complex natural systems that make life possible on this odd planet on the outskirts
of the Milky Way.

